# Argus Evidence-Gated Roadmap Roadmap states are `NOW`, `NEXT`, `LATER`, and `DEFERRED`. Percent-complete claims are intentionally not used. A state changes only when its binary exit gate and evidence are satisfied. ## NOW — Argus 1.0 supervised defensive assessment release candidate - **Objective:** close one coherent, reviewable supervised V1 release candidate. - **Included scope:** worktree recovery; Path A V2 isolation; claim reconciliation; canonical control pack; deterministic dashboard; Python 3.12 regression, security, dependency, package, wheel, CLI, CI, and CodeQL gates. - **Exclusions:** operational V2, external signer, external/WORM anchor, network-exposed service, multi-user authentication, live deployment, and Phase 3–6 features. - **Dependencies:** Phase 1 and Phase 2A merged baselines; hash-locked Python dependencies; GitHub Actions and CodeQL. - **Security boundary:** no live traffic or credentials; no scope, tool, approval, sandbox, audit, redirect, or web-boundary weakening. - **Verification commands:** the full command set in [`RUNBOOK.md`](RUNBOOK.md), including pytest, Ruff baseline comparison, changed-file Ruff, Bandit, pip-audit, clean archive build, wheel smoke, deterministic generation, and link validation. - **Binary exit gate:** one PR merged with every required check green, no new CodeQL alert, one read-only reviewer with no unresolved blocker, clean post-merge main, and no deployment performed. - **Evidence:** pull request, CI/CodeQL URLs, final `STATUS.json`, generated dashboard, and merge SHA. - **Owner:** Georgi Gaydarov; implementation executed by the sole Codex session. - **Current state:** complete. PR #17 merged as `b75af239c441204699114ce34970e37b394b3c21`; post-merge [CI 30523751828](https://github.com/gesh75/argus/actions/runs/30523751828) and [CodeQL 30523751784](https://github.com/gesh75/argus/actions/runs/30523751784) passed with zero open CodeQL alerts. - **Re-entry condition:** any regression or contradicted release claim reopens `NOW`; no later phase starts first. ## NEXT — Bounded V2 operational foundation - **Objective:** complete one end-to-end, dry-run-first V2 lifecycle. - **Included scope:** typed proposals/results; explicit operator targets; guardrail authorization immediately before existing collector execution; normalized observations; asset-bound correlation; deterministic path identity; versioned transactional graph persistence; truthful new/changed/ closed deltas; one bounded CLI command. - **Exclusions:** unattended scheduling, production claims, remediation, multi-user operation, and arbitrary model-generated commands. - **Dependencies:** merged `NOW`; approved V2 design specification; current V1 collectors and guardrail reused without bypass. - **Security boundary:** explicit target input; no target synthesis; no blanket exception suppression; no new execution path around `Guardrail.authorize()`. - **Verification commands:** focused unit tests plus end-to-end save→reload→rerun→delta tests, idempotence checks, crash/corruption tests, full release gates, and dry-run CLI smoke. - **Binary exit gate:** the complete proposal→authorization→collector→ observation→graph→correlation→persistence→delta chain passes end to end; repeated cycles are idempotent; no continuous loop is enabled by default. - **Evidence:** approved design, executable tests, committed implementation, green PR CI/CodeQL, operator runbook. - **Owner:** unassigned until separately authorized. - **Current state:** queued, not started. - **Re-entry condition:** start only from the merged `NOW` main SHA with a fresh branch and explicit authorization. ## NEXT — Out-of-band audit signer - **Objective:** resolve GitHub issue #4 by removing the HMAC key from the orchestrator process. - **Included scope:** signer protocol, authentication, redacted failure semantics, availability behavior, key lifecycle, recovery, operations, rollback, and tests. - **Exclusions:** external/WORM storage adapter unless separately approved. - **Dependencies:** approved threat model and signer boundary; preservation of Phase 2A record compatibility. - **Security boundary:** orchestrator never receives signing key material; signer failure denies audit-dependent actions. - **Verification commands:** protocol tests, authentication failures, availability failures, replay compatibility, full regression and security gates. - **Binary exit gate:** tool runner process and child environments contain no signing key while every audit operation remains fail closed and verifiable. - **Evidence:** issue #4 closure PR, test report, operations and rollback proof. - **Owner:** unassigned until separately authorized. - **Current state:** open issue; not a blocker for supervised isolated V1. - **Re-entry condition:** separately approved security increment. ## LATER — Independently administered external anchor - **Objective:** detect valid whole-record tail removal outside the controller trust domain. - **Included scope:** authenticated external adapter, append/retention policy, outage behavior, reconciliation, monitoring, and restore procedure. - **Exclusions:** describing local JSON as WORM. - **Dependencies:** external administration and storage selection; signer architecture decision. - **Security boundary:** independent credentials and administration; outage fails closed for deployments claiming the stronger integrity level. - **Verification commands:** tamper, outage, stale/ahead/divergent, restore, authorization, and retention-policy tests. - **Binary exit gate:** independently administered evidence detects a valid local tail deletion and cannot be rewritten by the Argus controller. - **Evidence:** provider configuration, retention proof, test report, runbook. - **Owner:** unassigned. - **Current state:** later. - **Re-entry condition:** required before any higher-trust or regulated deployment evaluation. ## LATER — Browser-executed console security suite - **Objective:** supplement static DOM-sink checks with actual browser behavior. - **Included scope:** malicious result fixtures, rendering, navigation, CSP and localhost-boundary assertions. - **Exclusions:** network exposure or multi-user UI. - **Dependencies:** stable V1 console. - **Security boundary:** synthetic data only; no live targets. - **Verification commands:** Playwright browser test and current ASGI/static regressions. - **Binary exit gate:** malicious fixtures execute no script and render only as text in a real browser. - **Evidence:** trace/screenshots and CI test results. - **Owner:** unassigned. - **Current state:** later, non-blocking for current release. - **Re-entry condition:** begin in the next UI-focused increment. ## DEFERRED — Unattended continuous service - **Objective:** evaluate opt-in scheduled defensive sensing only after the V2 foundation is operational. - **Included scope:** scheduling, cancellation, backpressure, observability, bounded failure policy, operator controls, and safe shutdown. - **Exclusions:** permanent autonomous remediation. - **Dependencies:** complete `NEXT` V2 lifecycle, external signer decision, durable persistence, and an approved operations model. - **Security boundary:** no default-on loop; every action reauthorized; bounded targets, cadence, budgets, and stop controls. - **Verification commands:** soak, crash, cancellation, fault-injection, idempotence, authorization, and operations tests. - **Binary exit gate:** approved threat model and bounded soak evidence show no skipped authorization, hidden failure, duplicate action, or unbounded retry. - **Evidence:** separate design/implementation PR and operations record. - **Owner:** unassigned. - **Current state:** deferred. - **Re-entry condition:** all dependencies complete and owner explicitly authorizes this separate increment. ## DEFERRED — Production, regulated, network-exposed, or multi-user deployment - **Objective:** define a product boundary appropriate for higher-trust use. - **Included scope:** authenticated identities, tenant isolation, secrets/PHI controls, deployment hardening, monitoring, recovery, compliance evidence, external signer, and external anchor. - **Exclusions:** retroactive claim that alpha lab evidence proves production readiness. - **Dependencies:** organizational risk acceptance and all prerequisite engineering increments. - **Security boundary:** deny by default until independently reviewed and explicitly deployed. - **Verification commands:** dedicated threat model, penetration test, deployment validation, disaster recovery exercise, and compliance review. - **Binary exit gate:** owner and independent security reviewers approve a separately versioned deployment profile with reproducible evidence. - **Evidence:** future deployment record; none exists today. - **Owner:** unassigned. - **Current state:** deferred. - **Re-entry condition:** explicit owner authorization after technical and operational prerequisites are complete.